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Abstract
The evolution of education spending in California has received plenty of attention by both
academics and practitioners after this state￿ s education ￿nance reform of the 1970￿ s. The im-
pact on public education spending of the demographic trends associated with immigration has
not been thoroughly analyzed, instead. This paper quanti￿es the contribution of immigration
to the relative decline in elementary and secondary public education spending per student in
California in the period 1970 to 2000. A simple quantitative model of school choice and voting
over public education is used to perform the counterfactual experiment of interest. The model
allows for household heterogeneity in income, number of school-age children, citizenship and
immigration status, and preference for education. The results indicate that immigration played
a quantitative important role in accounting for the relative decline in education spending in
California, especially after 1990. In the year 2000, the model predicts that education spending
per student in California would have been 24 percent higher than in reality if U.S. immigration
had been restricted to its 1970 level.
Keywords: Immigration, Public Education, Private Education, Education Finance Reform, Cal-
ifornia.
JEL Classi￿cation: D7, F22, H52, H75, I22.
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11 Introduction
In this paper I study the impact of immigration on spending on elementary and secondary public
education in California over the period 1970-2000. In doing so, the paper contributes to the debate on
two important issues that have attracted much attention from policy makers and academics alike. The
￿rst debate concerns the e⁄ects of immigration on the well-being and economic outcomes of natives.
The e⁄ect of immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives has been extensively analyzed in
the economics literature (see Borjas, 2003 and Ottaviano and Peri, 2008 for two di⁄erent views on
this issue). Less attention has been devoted to analyze the interaction of immigrants and natives
that occurs through government spending and taxes. In particular, spending on public education is
one of the most important items on the budget of state and local governments.
The second debate concerns the signi￿cant decline in public education spending per student that
occurred in California - the main immigrant-receiving state in the U.S. - relative to the rest of the
country since the early 1970￿ s. While the economics literature has emphasized the role played by ed-
ucation ￿nance reform from a foundation system to a state system (see, e.g., Silva and Sonstelie, 1995
and Fernandez and Rogerson, 1999), relatively little attention has been paid to the underlying demo-
graphic trends that took place over this period. According to the 2000 U.S. Census of Population,
school-age children from households whose head had immigrated to the U.S. after 1970 accounted
for about 40 percent of total enrollment in elementary and secondary school (Table 2). The corre-
sponding ￿gure for the rest of the U.S. was 13 percent. In all Census years, California households
whose head had immigrated to the U.S. after 1970 had, on average, more school-age children than
native households, and more than twice as many in 1990 and 2000. These households accounted for
about 30 percent of all households in California in 2000 (Table 2), while the corresponding ￿gure for
the rest of the U.S. is only 8 percent.
The paper develops a quantitative political-economy model of education spending to answer the
following counterfactual question: ￿what would have been the level of education spending per student
in California in 1980-2000 if U.S. immigration had been restricted to its 1970 level?￿The main result of
the paper is that immigration has played a quantitatively important role in the decline in education
spending per student in California. Speci￿cally, I estimate that in the academic year 1999-2000
2education spending per student in California was about $1,459 (in 1999 dollars) lower than it would
have been if U.S. immigration had been restricted to its 1970 level. This represents about 24 percent
of actual education spending per student in California in 2000. For sake of comparison, estimates
of the e⁄ects of education ￿nance reform (see e.g. Fernandez and Rogerson, 1999 and Hoxby, 2001)
suggest that education spending per student in California without the reform would have been about
11-18 percent higher than in reality.
In order to answer the counterfactual question above, I employ a political-economy model where
California￿ s households who are U.S. citizens vote over expenditures on public education in a state-
wide voting round. The latter setting is consistent with the institutional setup of education ￿nance
in California where, since the early 1980￿ s, current spending for elementary and secondary public
education has been virtually equalized across students, reducing the scope for Tiebout mobility.1 In
the model, households are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their income, number of
school-age children, immigration status, citizenship status, and the weight they attach to education
relative to consumption in their utility function. Households with school-age children choose between
private and public education.
The model￿ s parameters are estimated using micro data from the 1980 U.S. Census and data on
public education spending from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The estimated
model accounts well for the evolution of education spending in California in the subsequent Census
years 1990 and 2000. The counterfactual exercise is performed by conditioning the joint distribution
of household income, number of children, and citizenship status on households whose head is either
a native or had immigrated to the U.S. prior to 1970. Given this joint conditional distribution,
the model is then used to compute counterfactual tax rates and private school enrollment rates for
1980, 1990, and 2000. The model predicts increasingly higher levels of spending per student from
1980 to 2000 in the counterfactual economy, culminating with the gain of about $1,459 per student
cited above. The estimated preferences are also used to compute the cost of immigration for native
households, expressed as an equivalent variation. The estimated costs are about 70 percent larger
than those obtained by keeping the level of education spending per capita constant in the economy
with restricted immigration and simply reducing the tax burden on native households. The latter
1See Sonstelie et al. (2000) for an informative account of education ￿nance reform in California.
3approach is commonly used in computing the ￿scal cost of immigration (e.g. National Research
Council, 1997).
As already mentioned above, this paper is related to both the literature on the impact of immi-
gration on native workers and households and the literature on education ￿nance reform. While a
large part of the immigration literature focuses on the labor market interactions between immigrants
and natives (see Borjas, 1999 for a review), some researchers have asked whether immigrants tend
to participate in the U.S. welfare system more than natives (Borjas and Hilton, 1996), while others
have, more generally, attempted to compute the sign and size of the net ￿scal transfer from natives
to immigrants including both government spending as well as taxes (see Clune, 1998 and Garvey
and Espenshade, 1998). This line of research takes an ￿accounting￿perspective by computing the
￿scal costs and bene￿ts of immigration, given the existing system of transfers, government spending,
and taxes. As argued by the National Research Council (1997 page 259) panel: ￿The assumption of
exogenous ￿scal policies provides useful short-term estimates for state and local government e⁄ects.
Future work in this area could examine how much immigration a⁄ects ￿scal policies ... and incor-
porate such endogenous e⁄ects into the modeling exercise.￿This paper represents a ￿rst step in this
direction.2
While the relationship between immigration and spending on public education in California has
been largely ignored in the academic literature, some political commentators have emphasized this
point before.3 For example, the journalist Peter Schrag (1998, page 277) writes in his book Par-
adise Lost that ￿...the new California economy sits atop such a large immigrant population...whose
presence, at least in the short run, not only depresses wage scales at the lower end but reduces
the incentive to provide infrastructure and public services that would probably have been o⁄ered
as a matter of course to groups considered genuinely ￿American￿ .￿One of the themes of Schrag￿ s
book is that the relative drop in spending per student in California is due to the lack of political
representation of immigrants that, due to their lower incomes and higher number of children would
be the primary bene￿ciaries of additional spending in public education. My analysis con￿rms that
2Storesletten (2000) argues that the problems faced by the U.S. social security system might be partially resolved
by an immigration policy focused on the in￿ ow of high-skilled workers from abroad.
3Silva and Sonstelie (1995) do consider enrollment growth as a possible reason for the decline in public education
spending per student in the 1980￿ s. However, they restrict themselves to a model in which all households have the
same number of children. Thus, in their model, the tax price of education spending does not change in response to an
in￿ ow of households.
4increasing the political weight of immigrants by allowing them to vote in the political-economy model
results in higher equilibrium spending per student. However, this lack of political representation only
accounts for a relatively small share of the observed drop in education spending per student.
The literature on the e⁄ects of states￿education ￿nance reform on education spending levels is
relatively large. California represents the most prominent example of a shift from local to state level
funding. This shift began in 1971 with the ￿rst Serrano ruling by which the California Supreme
Court declared the education ￿nance system unconstitutional and continued with the passage of
Proposition 13 in 1978. By the early 1980￿ s public education spending per student had been largely
equalized within the state of California.4 The consequence of California￿ s reform have been widely
studied in the literature. Silva and Sonstelie (1995), Fernandez and Rogerson (1999), Sonstelie et
al. (2000), and Hoxby (2001) point to this reform as the main reason for the observed decline in
education spending per pupil in California in the 1980￿ s and early 1990￿ s. Murray, Evans, and Schwab
(1998), instead, estimate a positive e⁄ect of education ￿nance reform on average spending per pupil
using panel data on U.S. states. The purpose of this paper is not so much to dispute the importance
of education ￿nance reform in accounting for some of the observed drop in education spending
per student in California. Instead, the paper tries to quantify the contribution of immigration. My
empirical results suggest that education ￿nance reform was slightly more important than immigration
in explaining the drop in spending per student in California in 1980 and 1990, but that by the year
2000 immigration had become a much more important factor.
Last, the results of this paper are related to and consistent with the empirical evidence in Poterba
(1997) and Fernandez and Rogerson (2001). Using panel data on U.S. states these authors show that
for given level of aggregate income, and controlling for state ￿xed-e⁄ects, the elasticity of education
spending per student with respect to changes in the number of students enrolled in school is close to
￿1. Di⁄erently from this exclusively empirical work, I endogenize the choice of education spending
and school choice and I identify and focus on a speci￿c demographic shock - immigration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic trends about education
spending in California and the rest of the U.S. starting in 1970. Section 3 describes the model
4When the Serrano plainti⁄s returned to court in 1983, the judge wrote, rejecting their case, that ￿It is this court￿ s
view that the proper standard for testing compliance with the judgement is whether the Legislature has done all that
is reasonably feasible to reduce disparities in per-pupil expenditures to insigni￿cant di⁄erences. As is discussed, the
state has met this standard and surpassed it.￿(cited by Sonstelie et al., 2000, page 55).
5economy. Section 4 discusses the estimation of the model￿ s parameters. Section 5 develops the
counterfactual exercise, while Section 6 uses the model to compute the ￿scal costs of immigration.
Section 7 considers a host of extensions of the basic framework of Section 3. Last, Section 8 concludes.
A description of the data is contained in the Appendix
2 Empirical Evidence
2.1 Decomposition of Spending per Pupil over Time
The key variable of interest in this study is current education spending per student enrolled in
public elementary and secondary school in California.5 In this section I consider the evolution of
this variable over time for California relative to the rest of the U.S. and decompose its evolution in
di⁄erent components. To ￿x ideas, it is convenient to denote aggregate nominal spending for public
elementary and secondary education in location k at time t by Et
k; where the index k equals CA
(California) or US￿ (the U.S. excluding California). Let Ht
k denote the total number of households in
k at time t, and let Nt
k stand for enrollment in public schools. Last, Y t
k is a measure of total nominal
income in k at time t.
By de￿nition, log spending per student in CA relative to the rest of the US at time t can be






























or, in words, as the sum of (log) relative education spending per unit of income, plus relative income
per household, and relative number of households per student enrolled in public schools. I am
interested in the evolution of these variables starting from a given point in time. Data availability
does not allow me to start earlier than the school year 1969-70.6 This initial date, however, works
well because the resurgence of large-scale immigration to the U.S. dates back to the Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 which facilitated immigration for family uni￿cation purposes.
5The NCES de￿nes current expenditures as ￿The expenditures for operating local public schools, excluding capital
outlay and interest on school debt. These expenditures include such items as salaries for school personnel, ￿xed
charges, student transportation, school books and materials, and energy costs.￿
6As a convention, in what follows I refer to the school year 1969-70 as 1970.
6Also, the major education reform that equalized spending per student in California occurred in the
1970￿ s.
Taking the di⁄erence between equation (1) in year t and its equivalent in 1970 provides the basis
for the analysis of the determinants of the evolution of spending per student in California relative to































I implement the decomposition in equation (2) empirically using both yearly and decennial data.
Figure 1 represents the decomposition with yearly data for the period 1970-2005. Data on current
spending in public elementary and secondary education and fall enrollment are from the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Data on household income and the number of households is
derived from the Current Population Survey (Annual Social and Economic Supplements). Figure 2
represents the same decomposition at intervals of ten years. The public education expenditures data
are again from the NCES. Data on enrollment in elementary and secondary public schools, number
of households, and household income are from the decennial Census of Population, 1970-2000.
The ￿gures represent the percent di⁄erence between the value of a variable - for example spending
per student - in California relative to the rest of the U.S. in a given year and its value in 1970. They
show a remarkable deterioration in California￿ s relative spending per student. The latter declines
by more than 20 percent between 1970 and 2005, reaching a low point in the mid-1990￿ s. These
￿gures also suggest that this drop cannot be accounted for by a decline in the fraction of income
spent on public education in California relative to the rest of the U.S. According to Figure 1, in 2005
California was spending almost the same fraction of its income in public education relative to the rest
of the U.S. as in 1970. Figure 2 instead shows a small decline in this indicator. However, the reason
for this decline is the fact that relative income per household in California grew faster according to
the U.S. Census measure of income than according to the CPS measure of income. In fact, when
considering education spending per household, as opposed to per student enrolled, California does
7The operator ￿ is such that ￿xt = xt ￿ x1970.
7not seem to gain or lose relative to the rest of the U.S. between 1970 and 2005. The reason why
per student spending exhibits such a large decline, instead, is mainly the increase in the student to
household ratio in California relative to the rest of the U.S. For example, in 1970 there were 1.40 and
1.35 households in California and in the rest of the U.S., respectively, for each student enrolled in
public school. In 2005, there were 2.34 households per student in the rest of the U.S., but only 1.97
in California. Notice how the cumulative change in the relative ratio E=N between 1970 and 2005 is
almost identical to the cumulative trend followed by the relative ratio H=N.
It is also interesting to notice from those ￿gures that the demographic shift that led to lower
relative H=N ratios in California in 2005 did not start until about 1980. Figure 1 also shows how the
ratio of education spending to income declined quickly in California between the mid-1970￿ s and the
early 1980￿ s, remaining constant until the mid 1990￿ s and then exhibiting an upward trend. Figure
2, which uses data from the U.S. Census to compute the income measure shows a further decline in
spending relative to income for California until 1990. However, this decline is simply the counterpart
of faster growth in income per household in the 1980￿ s in California than in the rest of the U.S.
as recorded by the Census, suggesting that education spending per household was actually fairly
constant during the 1980￿ s also according to the Census data. It is fair to interpret these trends as
suggesting that the e⁄ect of the Serrano ruling on education spending relative to income emphasized
by Fernandez and Rogerson (1999) had already fully taken place by the early 1980￿ s.
Table 1 represents the levels of the main statistics about education spending, household income,
and school enrollment in the di⁄erent Census years for California and the rest of the U.S.
2.2 Immigration
What role did immigration play in generating the trends emphasized in Figures 1 and 2? To
answer this question, in this section I present results from a simple statistical counterfactual exercise.
Speci￿cally, I generate a new series for the logarithm of relative (California vs the rest of the U.S.)
spending per capita in public education replacing the term Ht
k=Nt
k in equation (1) with the ratio of
the number of households headed by either a U.S. native individual or an individual who immigrated
to the U.S. before 1970 to the number of children living in such households and enrolled in elemen-
tary and secondary public schools. To construct the counterfactual series, I use the Census data,
8which contains information about an individual￿ s birthplace and allows me to distinguish between
households headed by native and households headed by foreign-born individuals. Figure 3 reports
the actual data series (solid line) of relative spending in public education per school-age child and the
corresponding counterfactual series (dashed line). As the ￿gure shows, relative education spending
per student in California would have been about the same in 2000 as it was in 1970 if the ratio of
households per public-school student in California had been equal to the value computed for native
and pre-1970 immigrant households only.
As Table 2 shows, immigrant headed households in California have on average signi￿cantly more
school-age children than native households and the fraction of immigrant-headed households has
increased dramatically over time. The table shows that immigrant headed households are both
more likely to have some school-age children than native households and, among households with
children, they tend to have more school-age children, on average. The fraction of school children from
immigrant-headed households has increased by about 40 percentage points in the period 1970-2000,
a remarkable demographic shock.
2.3 Private Schools
Downes and Schoeman (1998) have argued that California￿ s school ￿nance reform of the 1970￿ s
has led to a signi￿cant increase in enrollment into private schools. A similar argument can be made
regarding the reaction of native households to California￿ s immigration wave. Betts and Fairlie (2003)
use Census data to document the existence of a negative relationship between immigrant in￿ ow in
a metropolitan area and enrollment rates in private schools. It is therefore informative to use the
Census data to evaluate the evolution of private school enrollment in elementary and secondary
education in California relative to the rest of the U.S. Figure 4 plots the evolution of private school
enrollment rates for California relative to the rest of the U.S., distinguishing between enrollment rates
of children of households headed by natives and foreigners. The ￿gure shows a remarkable increase
in private school enrollment rates among native households in the 1970￿ s, and a smaller increase in
the 1980￿ s. Since 1990, private school enrollment rates for native households have stayed constant
or declined. For households headed by a foreign-born individual private school relative enrollment
rates have remained fairly constant between 1970 and 2000. For California as a whole private school
9enrollment rates have increased in the 1970￿ s, but declined since then. This is due to a composition
e⁄ect, as the share of school-age immigrant children has increased, and the latter are more likely to
attend public than private school.
3 Model
In this section I introduce a simple political-economy model of spending on public education and
household choice of public vs private education. The model is then calibrated to the data and used
to interpret the trends in public education spending per student.
The economy (California) is populated by a measure one of households with preferences de￿ned
over a composite private good di⁄erent from education, denoted by c for consumption, per-student
spending on public education, denoted by e; and per child spending on private education, z: A
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￿￿e￿=￿ + ￿e￿=￿ if n > 0 and children attend public school
￿￿e￿=￿ + ￿z￿=￿ if n > 0 and children attend private school
￿￿e￿=￿ if n = 0
(3)
where n denotes the household￿ s number of school-age children and ￿ < 1; ￿; and ￿ are parameters.
The functional form in equation (3) is a generalization of the one adopted by Fernandez and Rogerson
(1999, 2003). There are three dimensions in which the preferences considered here are more general
than the ones used by Fernandez and Rogerson. First, I allow households with children to choose
private instead of public education. By assumption, households cannot consume both public and
private education services. Second, there is unobserved heterogeneity about the intensity of prefer-
ences for education among households. The latter is captured by the household-speci￿c parameter
￿ 2 (0;1). Last, the utility function di⁄ers from the one adopted by Fernandez and Rogerson,
because the preference for public education depends on whether a household has or does not have
8This class of preferences exhibits a unit income elasticity of education spending relative to income. This is
consistent with the empirical evidence in Fernandez and Rogerson (2001). In assuming that households care about
public education spending per student, I am implicitly postulating a constant returns to scale technology in the
provision of education, in which marginal and average production costs coincide.
10school-age children. All households, including those without children and those with children in pri-
vate school are assumed to place a positive weight on public education spending per student. The
size of this weight is represented by the constant ￿ multiplied by the household-speci￿c parameter
￿. The positive weight on education by all households can be thought of as re￿ ecting the external
e⁄ects associated with a more educated population (lower crime, a more educated electorate, etc.).9
In practice, this assumption is needed in order to generate some positive amount of public education
provided in the majority-voting equilibrium of the model: according to the Census data, in any given
year, about 70 percent of households have no children enrolled in primary or secondary school, both
in California and in the rest of the U.S.10
Spending on public education is ￿nanced through a linear tax s on household income y. Spending





where y denote average household income in the economy and np is the number of children attending
public school per household. Equation (4) assumes that the income of all households is taxed at the
same rate s. In particular, the model abstracts from issues of tax evasion and illegal immigration.
While it would be straightforward to modify the model to allow for tax evasion, the lack of reliable
data on undocumented immigration and tax evasion make it di¢ cult to incorporate this phenomenon
into the empirical model.11
9The assumption that the external e⁄ect in equation (3) depends only on public education spending, as opposed to
the sum of public and private spending is innocuous for all the results of the paper.
10While in most models of education spending in the local public ￿nance literature (see Epple and Nechyba, 2004 for
a review) all households are assumed to have one child, this assumption is less appropriate to study the consequences
of immigration by households with a large number of children relative to native households. Moreover, Poterba (1997)
has shown how support for public education is lower in U.S. states with a higher percentage of population over 65
years old. Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982) document, using survey data, that individuals with school-age
children prefer signi￿cantly higher levels of per student school expenditures.
11It is worthwhile to stress two points on illegal immigration. First, I suspect that the prediction of the model
would not change signi￿cantly if illegal immigrants represented a constant fraction of the population over time. In this
case, in fact, allowing for tax evasion would a⁄ect the equilibrium of the model mainly by changing the magnitude of
the estimated parameters of Section 4. A potentially more important e⁄ect of tax evasion would occur if the latter
phenomenon were to become increasingly important over time, thus leading to an equilibrium decline in education
spending per student. Thus, from this perspective, the counterfactual results of Section 5 would represent a lower
bound on the e⁄ect of immigration on education spending in California. Second, the view that illegal immigrants do
not pay state and local taxes is not supported by the available evidence. For example, according to the U.S. General
Accounting O¢ ce (1994), estimated that in 1992 illegal aliens contributed 1.1 billion dollars in state and local revenue
in California. To place this ￿gure in perspective, the same study by the GAO estimates that the cost of elementary
11A household with children can also opt for private education. Thus, a household￿ s consumption
is equal to its after-tax income minus any spending on private education:
c = y(1 ￿ s) ￿ nzI (z);
where I am assuming that the household spends the same amount z in private education for all of
its children.
Given s; in case the household opts for private education, its indirect utility is de￿ned as:
V (y (1 ￿ s);n;e;￿) ￿ max
z fu(y(1 ￿ s) ￿ nz;e;z;n;￿)g:
Conditional on opting for private education, the optimal amount of private education chosen by







Notice that the per-child optimal investment in private education is increasing in the household￿ s
after-tax income and decreasing in the number of children.
A household that chooses public over private education (z = 0) receives utility:
U (y (1 ￿ s);n;e;￿) ￿ u(y(1 ￿ s);e;0;n;￿);
where the dependence of U on n is due to the fact that households with school-age children value
public education di⁄erently from households without children.
Of course, a household will choose public over private school if and only if:
U (y (1 ￿ s);n;e;￿) ￿ V (y (1 ￿ s);n;e;￿):
Let the household￿ s indirect utility function be denoted by:
v (y (1 ￿ s);n;e;￿) = maxfU (y (1 ￿ s);n;e;￿);V (y (1 ￿ s);n;e;￿)g: (6)
and secondary education for illegal aliens in California in 1994 was about 1.6 billion dollars.
12Denote by b y the level of income at which a household with n children is indi⁄erent between private
and public schools:





















Higher spending per student on public education would increase the income cut-o⁄ for attending
private school. For given spending, a higher tax rate s has the same e⁄ect, by reducing the household￿ s
disposable income. A higher number of children in the household has the e⁄ect of increasing the
income cut-o⁄ for private school.
In addition to their income and number of children, households di⁄er in three other dimensions.
First, I distinguish between households headed by a citizen (x = 1) and households headed by a
non-citizen (x = 0). Citizenship allows a household to vote for spending on public education, but
does not a⁄ect directly any other element of its preferences or budget constraint. Second, in order to
conduct counterfactual experiments, I distinguish between native and pre-1970 immigrant (m = 1)
households on the one hand and new immigrant households on the other (m = 0). In Section 5
a household is considered ￿new immigrant￿ if its head immigrated to the U.S. after 1970. Last,
households also di⁄er in terms of the weight attached to education spending, ￿.
Let f(y;n;x;m;￿) denote the joint density of income, number of children, citizenship, and the
parameter ￿ in the population of households. For given s and e, the per household measure of children








n ￿ f(y;n;x;m;￿)dyd￿: (8)
Since b y is increasing in s, a higher tax rate increases public school attendance. This implies that
spending per student might actually drop in response to an increase in the tax rate, as ￿rst pointed
out by Epple and Romano (1996).
The tax rate s is assumed to be determined by majority voting by households headed by a U.S.
citizen. In what follows I focus on a myopic majority-voting equilibrium in which, when voting,
households take as given their own choice of school as well as the choice of all other households.
Formally, a majority-voting equilibrium is comprised of a tax rate s￿, levels of public and private
13school spending per student, e￿ and z￿, and a measure of students attending public school n￿
p, such
that:
￿ Private school spending per student, z￿; by a household characterized by (y;n;￿) is given by
equation (5) if y > b y (n;s￿;e￿;￿) and zero else.
￿ The government￿ s budget constraint, equation (4), is satis￿ed.
￿ Public school attendance n￿
p is given by equation (8).
￿ The equilibrium tax rate and level of spending (s￿;e￿) are preferred by at least 50 percent of






It is straightforward to show that, at a majority-voting equilibrium, the preferred tax rate by a
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[(1 + ￿)￿]
1










￿￿1 if n > 0 and y > b y (n;s￿;e￿;￿)
(￿￿)
1
￿￿1 if n = 0
Everything else equal, the preferred tax rate for households with children in private school is
smaller than the preferred tax rate of households without children, which, in turn, is smaller than
the preferred tax rate of households with children in public school. The term n￿
py=y in equation (10)
is the tax price of spending per student for a household with income y. It represents the amount by
which this household￿ s taxes would have to increase for a unit increase in e. The e⁄ect of a change
in the tax price on a household￿ s preferred tax rate is governed by the sign of the parameter ￿.
Speci￿cally, in the borderline case in which ￿ = 0 (log preferences), the preferred tax is independent
14of the tax price, while if ￿ < 0, as will be assumed in the empirical section of the paper, a higher tax
price increases the household￿ s preferred tax rate.12
Since voting is assumed to be myopic, households preferences are single-peaked over tax rates.
Thus, the majority-voting equilibrium tax rate s￿ is the median tax rate when citizen households￿
preferred rates are sorted from lowest to highest. Let Q(s;e;np) denote the fraction of households
with a citizen head whose most-preferred tax rate is smaller than s when spending in public education
is e and the per-household number of students enrolled in public school is np: Then, a median voter


















and equations (5), (8) and (9) hold.
4 Empirical Implementation
The model is calibrated to the beginning of the post-education reform period in California, around
1980. To calibrate the economy I need to specify the values of the two preference parameters ￿; ￿;
that are common to all households in the population, and estimate the joint density f(y;n;x;m;￿)
for each Census year.
Consider ￿rst the parameter ￿: The value of ￿ determines the tax price elasticity of the demand
for education for the median voter through the following equation:






Lower values of ￿ are associated with a more price-inelastic demand. This parameter could in
principle be estimated by exploiting the observed variation in income and education spending per
student across two Census years. Instead of following this approach, I proceed by adopting the
value of ￿ preferred by Fernandez and Rogerson (1999) in their study of education ￿nance reform
12The sign of the parameter ￿ determines whether the substitution or income e⁄ect of higher income y prevails.
Since education is a normal good, a household would like to purchase more of it as its income increases. However, its
tax price also increases with y; generating a substitution e⁄ect in the opposite direction. The former e⁄ect prevails if
the parameter ￿ is negative.
15in California. Their preferred value, ￿ = ￿0:25; was such that their model generated the best ￿t
for the observed distribution of spending per student across students in California before education
￿nance reform. The implied tax price elasticity of education is about ￿0:81: This value is a bit higher
in absolute value than the range (￿0:25;￿0:5) reported by Bergstrom et al. (1982) in their survey
of the literature. In Section 7, I re-estimate the model assuming that ￿ = ￿1, with an associated
price elasticity of ￿0:52. It turns out that the benchmark version of the model accounts better for
the evolution of education spending in California in 1990 and 2000 than the version with a more
price-inelastic demand.
To calibrate the density f(y;n;x;m;￿), write the latter as:
f(y;n;x;m;￿) = f(y;￿jn;x;m)h(n;x;m); (12)
where h(n;x;m) is the joint density of (n;x;m): The joint density of (y;￿) conditional on (n;x;m)




























Notice that the parameters ￿y and ￿y are a function of n, x, and m; while the preference parameters
￿￿;￿￿; and ￿ are not. The parameters ￿y and ￿y are estimated by matching the conditional mean
and variance of the marginal density of household income, conditional on (n;x;m):
























where E [yjn;x;m] denotes and V [yjn;x;m] denote the conditional mean and variance of y. Citi-
zenship (x) and immigration status (m) take two possible values each, while a household￿ s number
of children (n) is assumed to take four possible values: 0, 1, 2, and 3+; where 3+ equals the average
16number of children in households with at least 3 children.13
To calibrate the remaining three parameters (￿￿;￿￿;￿) I use the following three moments. First,
since a lower average level of ￿ implies a higher number of children attending public school (see
equation 7), it is natural to set the parameter ￿￿ to match the per household number of children in
public school in 1980. According to the Census this number was 0.4722 (see Table 1). The parameter
￿ determines the degree to which preferences for education spending and income are correlated across
households. For example, if ￿ < 0; households with relatively low income tend to have higher values
of ￿ and are therefore more likely to have children attending private school than their income level
alone would predict. In practice, I set ￿ to match the ratio between the average incomes of households
with children in public and private schools in 1980. This ￿gure, computed from the Census data,
is 0.8151. The parameter ￿￿ determines the dispersion of ￿ in the population. Higher values of
￿￿ are associated with more dispersion in household income within private or public schools. This
parameter is set to match the coe¢ cient of variation of income across households with children in
public schools in 1980. This is equal to 0.6545, based on the 1980 Census data. Finally, the density
h(n;x;m) is estimated non-parametrically using the frequency count of each cell (n;x;m).
Notice that the parameters of the density f(y;n;x;m;￿) can be estimated independently from
the value of the parameter ￿ because the choice of school does not depend on ￿: Higher values of
￿ are associated with higher preferred tax rates by all households. This, in turn, translates into
majority-voting equilibria characterized by higher spending on public education. It is then possible
to pin down the value of ￿ at which the society chooses to spend exactly 4.94 percent of its income
in public education (s￿ = 0:0494; Table 1).
Table 3 reports the calibrated values of the parameters.14
[Table 3 here]
Notice that the estimated value of ￿ is negative. This is because the observed di⁄erence in
income across public and private school households is smaller than what a version of the model with
homogeneous ￿ would imply. Relatively poorer households that attend private school must do so
13This ￿gure was 3.43 in 1980 and 2000, and 3.40 in 1990.
14The estimates of the densities are available from the author upon request.
17because of an unobserved higher taste for education spending.15 Also, notice that the estimated
value of the parameter ￿ is smaller than one, which is consistent with the idea that, everything else
equal, households without children care less about public education spending than households with
children.
The Census data on private school attendance by household income and immigration status of the
household head provide useful information to evaluate the performance of the model. The calibrated
model can also be used to predict the share of spending in education as a fraction of total income,
enrollment in public schools, and other moments of interest for the Census years 1990 and 2000. In
using the model to predict outcomes for 1990 and 2000, I use the same parameters (￿;￿;￿￿;￿￿;￿)
from Table 3. The conditional densities f(y;￿jn;x;m) for 1990 and 2000 are re-estimated along the
lines described above for 1980.
Table 4 summarizes the moments predicted by the model and presents them against the actual
data for California.
[Table 4 here]
Notice that the model accounts reasonably well for the evolution of the triple (e;s;np) observed
in California in 1990 and 2000. Speci￿cally, the model correctly predicts the reduction in the share
of income devoted to public education between 1980 and 1990 and the subsequent rise between 1990
and 2000. There are two main forces that drive the dynamics of s in the model. The ￿rst one is
the variation over time in average income per public school student, y=np. Equation (10) and the
assumption of ￿ < 0 imply that as average income per student in public school rises, voters prefer
a smaller tax rate s but a higher level of spending per student. From Table 1, we know that the
ratio y=np went from $97,308 in 1980 to $132,365 in 1990 and subsequently fell to $125,124 in 2000.
This pattern is consistent with the qualitative variation in s generated by the model over this period.
The second major force that determines the dynamics of s is private school attendance by citizen
households. Higher private school attendance reduces the support for public education and tends to
15How should one interpret the negative estimate of the parameter ￿? This amounts to explain why there is more
income mixing in public schools than what the model would predict if ￿ had been zero. One explanation is that peer
e⁄ects are an important determinant of educational outcomes in addition to spending. If peer e⁄ects are related to
average income within a school and schools di⁄er in this dimension, high income households should be expected to
attend public schools more often than what predicted by this model. An alternative explanation is that households
have preferences for religious education and the intensity of these preferences is stronger for lower income households.
18lower the equilibrium tax rate. In this respect, notice that the model incorrectly predicts a slight
decline in private school attendance among native households between 1980 and 1990, while it gives
rise to an increase in the 1990￿ s, so that the predicted attendance rate is remarkably close to the data
in the year 2000. The model-predicted pattern of private school attendance by native households
tends to o⁄set the dynamics implied by the ratio y=np by increasing the equilibrium s in 1990 and
decreasing it in 2000.
Table 4 contains additional information about the model-predicted ratio of average incomes of
public and private school households and their average number of children. Notice that, consistently
with the data, public school households￿income has on average declined in the 1980￿ s and 1990￿ s
relative to its private school counterpart. Also, the model correctly predicts that public school
households have, on average, more school-age children than private school ones.
5 Counterfactual Exercise
In this section I use the model developed so far to provide an answer to the following question:
what level of public education spending per student would have occurred in California in 1980, 1990,
and 2000 if U.S. immigration would have been capped at its level in 1970? The model can be used to
compute counterfactual enrollment rates in private school and education spending relative to income.
To perform such exercise one has to take a stand about the role of at least two other potential e⁄ects
of immigration. First, we might need to evaluate the e⁄ect of restricted immigration on the income
of native households residing in California. Not considering this general equilibrium e⁄ect might
lead one to either under- or over- state the negative impact of immigrants on relative spending
per student in California. The e⁄ect of immigration on the labor income of natives and previous
cohorts of immigrants is the subject of some controversy in the literature (see e.g., Borjas, 2003 and
Card, 2007). Recent research by Ottaviano and Peri (2008) points to a possible positive e⁄ect of
immigrants on the average income of natives, but this ￿nding has been challenged by Borjas, Hanson,
and Grogger (2008). In light of the uncertainty about the e⁄ect of immigration on the income of
natives, I take as a benchmark the case in which the income of natives and pre-1970 immigrants
is una⁄ected by restrictions to immigration. Section 7 of the paper discusses the consequences of
19relaxing this assumption.
Second, given the tendency of immigrants to cluster in California, a smaller number of immigrants
might produce a compensatory in￿ ow of households from other parts of the U.S., as argued among
others by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997). The demographic characteristics of these households
would have a⁄ected, both directly and through the voting process, the level of spending on public
education. Again, the evidence on the extent to which immigration displaces internal migration by
natives is mixed (see Card, 2001 and Borjas, 2006 for two opposing views on this point). Also,
in this case I start by considering the benchmark in which restricting immigration does not induce
compensatory ￿ ows of households from other parts of the U.S. and discuss the role of this assumption
in Section 7.
Given these assumptions, I use the model to compute the counterfactual level of spending per child
and other indicators of interest in 1980, 1990, and 2000 excluding immigrant households whose head
immigrated into the U.S. in or after 1970, according to the U.S. Census. Formally, the conditional
density:





has to be used in the counterfactual exercise, instead of the one in equation (12).
Table 5 contains the results of these exercises.
[Table 5 here]
Notice that immigration has a large negative e⁄ect on spending per student, especially in 1990
and 2000. For example, in the latter year, in the economy with immigration restrictions spending
per student would have been $1,459 (or 24 percent) higher than in the benchmark economy. Most
of these gains are due to the large drop in the number of public school students per household from
about 0.52 in the benchmark economy (and in the data) to about 0.42 in the economy with restricted
immigration. In the year 2000, the economy with restricted immigration is also characterized by an
average income that is about $3,000 larger than in the data. Given that each additional dollar of
average income entails an increase in spending per student of about 10 cents, the increase in the
average level of income accounts for about 20 percent of the computed increase of $1,459 in spending
20per student in the counterfactual exercise.16
The switch from private to public education that occurs in response to restrictions to immigration
has in principle an ambiguous e⁄ect on education spending. On the one hand, as households move
into the public system they support higher levels of spending per student. One the other hand,
as households move into the public system, their children use some of its resources. In order to
assess the contribution of this mechanism to the results of Table 5, I recomputed the majority voting
equilibrium in the counterfactual economy keeping native households￿choice of private vs public
schooling constant at what it was in the benchmark model. Formally, this amounts to keeping the
income cut-o⁄for private school at the level b y (n;s￿;e￿;￿): The results of this exercise are reported in
Table 5 under the header ￿No Immigration - Constant School Choice￿ . They show how quantitatively
the second e⁄ect is larger than the ￿rst one, so that education spending per student would be higher
if households￿school choice is kept constant in the counterfactual exercise. The net e⁄ect is, however,
quantitatively small.
In order to place the magnitude of these results in perspective, the last two rows of Table 5 also
show a back-of-the-envelope calculation of what spending per students would have been in California
over time without its education ￿nance reform. In performing this computation I assume that the
income share of public education spending in California would have remained constant over time
at 98 percent of its value in the rest of the U.S. This ￿gure corresponds to the income share of
education spending in California relative to the rest of the U.S. in 1970. As the numbers in the table
suggest, in 1980 and 1990 without education ￿nance reform California would have enjoyed a higher
level of education spending corresponding to about $300 (1999 dollars) per student relative to the
no immigration scenario. In 2000, however, the quantitative importance of education ￿nance reform
would have been dominated by the importance of immigration as a determinant of education spending
per student. These computations, while raw, are consistent with the quantitative e⁄ects of education
￿nance reform estimated by Fernandez and Rogerson (1999) and Hoxby (2001). They suggest that,
especially in more recent times, immigration is likely to have played a more signi￿cant role than
education ￿nance reform in the relative decline of education spending per student in California.
16The actual sensitivity of spending per student to average income is s￿=n￿
p. With a tax rate of about 5 percent and
an average number of students per household of about 0.5, one obtains the ￿gure of 10 cents on the dollar.
216 Computing the Fiscal Impact of Immigrants
Most studies of the ￿scal impact of new immigrants assume that governments respond to the
￿ ow of new immigrants by holding constant the level of services provided to current residents (e.g.
National Research Council, 1997). This paper claims that, at least as far as public education spending
in California is concerned, this has not been the case. It is interesting to evaluate the extent to which
the assumption of a constant level of services leads to under or over estimate the ￿scal impact of
immigrants relative to the situation in which the level of services is endogenously determined.
According to the standard approach, the ￿scal cost of immigration is represented by the additional
taxes paid by households residing in California in the status-quo relative to an economy in which
immigration had been restricted to 1970 levels, while keeping education spending per student at the
same level in the two economies. In addition, in the standard approach public school attendance by
native households is assumed not to adjust to the new tax rates and spending levels in the economy
with restricted immigration. The ￿scal cost of immigration computed in this way is equal to 0.2,
0.9, 1.4 percent of native households￿income in the counterfactual economy in 1980, 1990, and 2000
respectively.
Alternatively, the cost of immigration can be computed by assuming that in the counterfactual
economy the tax rate and spending per student are determined by majority voting, given the new
structure of the economy as summarized by the conditional density in equation (15). The equivalent
variation ￿ (y;n;￿) for a household characterized by the triple (y;n;￿) is such that the following
indi⁄erence condition holds:
u(y(1 ￿ s
￿) + ￿ (y;n;￿) ￿ nz
￿;e
￿;z
￿;n;￿) = v ((1 ￿ s
c)y;n;e
c;￿); (16)
where the super-script ￿c￿denotes the majority-voting equilibrium in the counterfactual economy,
and the super-script ￿￿￿ represents the equilibrium in the status-quo. In words, the equivalent
variation represents the increase in a household￿ s consumption such that the household is indi⁄erent
between living in the status-quo economy and living in the counterfactual economy with restricted
immigration.17 The equivalent variation ￿ (y;n;￿) can be solved for analytically. For households
17Notice that in de￿ning the equivalent variation, I do not allow households in the benchmark economy to modify
22with children in school, the equivalent variation will depend on whether the children are in public or
private school in the status-quo and in the counterfactual economy. For simplicity, I only report the
measures for households without children and with children who are always enrolled in public school
in both scenarios. In these cases the equivalent variation takes the general form:





















￿(1 + ￿) if children enrolled in public school in both scenarios,
￿￿ if household has no children,
(18)
From Table 5 we know that the counterfactual economy has lower taxes and higher spending
per student (sc < s￿ and ec > e￿) than the benchmark economy. The equivalent variation takes both
of these advantages of the counterfactual economy into account. Thus, it is always the case that
￿ (y;n;￿) > 0: Moreover, when ￿ < 0 the elasticity of the equivalent variation with respect to
household income is larger than one if the household has no children or has children enrolled in
public school in both scenarios. Under this condition, in fact, households with a higher income
desire a higher level of spending in public education and taxes than households with lower incomes.
The former kind is therefore relatively more hurt by the reduction in spending per student that is
associated with immigration. In terms of ranking, it is straightforward to check that, everything else
equal and independently of ￿; households without children have a smaller equivalent variation than
households with children in public school, because the latter attach a higher weight to spending on
public education than the former.




￿ (y;n;￿)l(￿jy;n;m = 1)d￿;
where l(￿jy;n;m = 1) denotes the density of ￿ conditional on y; n, and the household being native
(m = 1). Figure 5 plots ￿ as a function of household income in the year 2000 for di⁄erent values
their choice of school in response to the transfer ￿:
23of n and for y below $300,000. For comparison, the ￿gure also represents the cost of immigration
as a function of natives￿income computed using the standard approach described above. According
to the latter the cost of immigration is a linearly increasing function of income. This is close to
the equivalent variation of households without children. For the other households the relationship
between ￿ (y;n) and y depends on two opposing forces. First, for households choosing public schools
or households without children, a higher y is associated with a higher willingness to pay for public
education (￿ < 0). Second, a higher y leads some households to switch from public to private
education. Since the equivalent variation for households with children in private school is lower
than for observationally (in terms of y and n) identical households with children in public school,
the average equivalent variation ￿ (y;n) might eventually decrease in y; re￿ ecting the increasing
share of households choosing private school. The latter e⁄ect prevails for households with one child
(n = 1), while the former prevails for households with three of more children. For households with
two children, instead, the two e⁄ects appear to balance out.
Table 6 reports the average (per household) ￿scal cost of immigration computed under the stan-
dard method in which spending per student is kept constant in response to immigration and the
equivalent variation measure described above.
[Table 6 here]
The utility-based cost computed according to the model is about 70 percent larger than the cost
computed according to the standard approach. As Figure 5 suggests, this di⁄erence is related to the
heterogeneity between households with and without children. From this ￿gure it appears that there
is not a large di⁄erence between the two measures of ￿scal cost of immigration for households without
children, but that for households with children the ￿scal cost is clearly higher when measured by the
equivalent variation. Consider ￿rst households without children. The latter account for about 70
percent of all households, so that the equilibrium level of spending mainly re￿ ects their preferences
for public education. It follows that their chosen bundle of consumption and education spending
must dominate all other budget-feasible bundles, in particular the one characterized by the same
24level of education spending and higher consumption.18 Therefore, a restriction on immigration that
yields higher spending per student makes households without children better o⁄, on average, than
a restriction on immigration that simply yields lower taxes. This argument is even stronger for
households with children. The latter prefer higher levels of spending in public education and taxes
than households without children. Therefore, a restriction on immigration that yields higher spending
per student makes households with children better o⁄, on average, than a restriction on immigration
that simply yields lower taxes.
7 Discussion and Extensions
In this section I discuss some of the assumptions of the basic model presented in Sections 3 and
4, and evaluate the impact of relaxing them on the main results.
7.1 E⁄ect of Immigrants on Natives￿Incomes
The analysis, thus far, has assumed that immigration has no e⁄ect on the income of native
households.19 While this is a useful benchmark to consider, it is worthwhile to try to evaluate the
e⁄ects of this assumption on the results of the counterfactual experiment of Section 5.
The current literature is not unanimous on the e⁄ect of immigration on the wages of native work-
ers. On the one hand, Borjas (2003) has argued that immigration signi￿cantly reduces the relative
wages of native workers in skill groups where the supply of foreign labor tends to concentrate. Others,
such as Card (2001, 2007), have played down the quantitative signi￿cance of such e⁄ects. Recently,
Ottaviano and Peri (2008) and Peri (2007) have argued that immigration might even increase the av-
erage wages of native workers because the latter are complements rather than substitutes for foreign
workers with the same observable skill mix. For our purposes, if immigrant workers had a negative
(positive) e⁄ect on the relative and absolute wages of natives, the results from the counterfactual
exercise of Section 5 would represent a lower (upper) bound for the e⁄ect of immigration on school
18As Figure 4 shows, high income households without children appear to lose more from immigration when the
standard approach to measuring its cost is used than with the equivalent variation measure. This is due to the
estimated negative correlation between unobserved preferences for education (￿) and household income (y).
19Recall that ￿native households￿also include households headed by a foreign-born individual who migrated into
the U.S. before 1970.
25spending. In order to evaluate the robustness of my results, I perform the counterfactual exercise
allowing for a decline in native households￿incomes following restrictions to immigration. To imple-
ment this e⁄ect in a tractable manner, I assume that the counterfactual joint distribution of natives￿
characteristics, instead of being given by equation (15), is instead given by











where ￿ is a positive constant which is less than one if the in￿ ow of immigrants contributes to in-
crease the wages of natives. The conditional density ￿
￿1f(y=￿;￿jn;x;1) in equation (19) corresponds
to a conditional joint distribution of income and unobserved heterogeneity that is lognormal with
parameters
￿
log￿ + ￿y (n;x;1);￿y (n;x;1);￿￿;￿￿;￿
￿
. Thus, the mean of the distribution of income
conditional on n and x, is increasing in ￿.20 Since preferences are homothetic, if all households￿
income is scaled down by the same factor ￿, the majority-voting equilibrium will yield the same









where yc and nc
p are the counterfactual average level of income and public school attendance per
household in the benchmark case of Section 5.21 Thus, the equilibrium level of public education
spending per student in the counterfactual economy in which the restriction on immigration reduces
the incomes of natives by 1 ￿ ￿ percent would be a fraction ￿ of the counterfactual level of spending
reported in Table 5.
Instead of calibrating the parameter ￿; I compute its value, denoted by b ￿; that would set the
spending level in the counterfactual economy equal to the actual level of spending predicted by the
benchmark version of the economy. The latter is given by b ￿ = e￿=ec: Based on the values of e￿ and
ec in Tables 4 and 5 for the 2000 Census, b ￿ is equal to about 0:81: In words, a ban on post-1970
immigration to the U.S. would have had to reduce California natives￿incomes by 19 percent in the
20Notice that ￿ a⁄ects both the mean and the variance of the marginal distribution of income, but not measures of
inequality, such as the coe¢ cient of variation. Thus, I am ignoring distributional e⁄ects of immigration (and associated
e⁄ects on the voting equilibrium) and instead focus on the average e⁄ect of immigration on incomes.
21Notice that the income cut-o⁄ for attending private school goes down by a factor of ￿. However, since all incomes
go down by the same factor, the proportion of households with income below the cut-o⁄ remains the same.
26year 2000 to o⁄set the negative impact of immigration of spending on public education.
To put this ￿gure in perspective it is instructive to consider the estimates of the impact of immi-
grants on the average wages of natives that are found in the immigration literature. The magnitude
of this estimate depends crucially on the size of the elasticity of substitution between natives and
immigrants with the same education and experience in the production function. Traditionally, the
literature (Borjas, 2003) has assumed an in￿nite elasticity of substitution, but Ottaviano and Peri
(2008, Table 3) estimate a value of about 20. With this elasticity they ￿nd that the 1990-2006 immi-
gration wave into the U.S. will contribute in the long-run to increase average wages for U.S. natives
by 0.6 percent. This is a relatively small number compared by 1￿b ￿: It might be argued correctly that
since California disproportionately attracts immigrants, U.S. wide averages are not representative of
what would have happened to average wages in California. Using the same theoretical and empirical
approach developed in Ottaviano and Peri (2008), Peri (2007, Table 9) estimates that immigrant
in￿ ows into California in the period between 1990 and 2004 have increased average wages by 2.2 per-
cent. Peri obtains this result assuming an elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives
of about 10, which is much smaller than the value estimated by Ottaviano and Peri (2008). Thus, the
2.2 percent ￿gure is likely to be an upper bound for the e⁄ect of 1990-2004 immigration on average
California wages. Thus, the available evidence does not suggest that the e⁄ect of immigration on
native incomes, even if on average positive, is large enough to change signi￿cantly the magnitude of
the impact of immigration on public education spending per student reported in Section 5.22
7.2 Fertility of Comparable Native Groups
A second and related point has to do with whether a restriction on immigration would cause
native workers from the rest of the U.S. to move to California. If this was the case, one would expect
little impact of national immigration restrictions on California￿ s local labor market, as argued by
Borjas (2006). This e⁄ect would provide a rationale for keeping native household￿ s incomes constant
in the counterfactual exercise. However, a second key question for my purposes, would be whether
22A caveat to these comparisons is represented by the fact that the Ottaviano-Peri results pertain only to wage
income. Immigration should also have a positive e⁄ect on capital income by virtue of the complementarity between
labor and capital in production (Borjas, 1999). While I am not aware of any empirical study of the e⁄ect of immigration
on the pro￿t income of corporations, a small literature has documented a positive e⁄ect of immigration on housing
prices and rents (Saiz, 2003 and Ottaviano and Peri, 2007).
27the increased school enrollment that might have resulted from this internal migration would have
caused spending per student in California to fall. In order to address this concern, I computed the
average number of children per household by income group and Census year of post-1970 immigrant
households residing in California, native households residing in California, and those not residing
in California.23 Within each income group and for each Census year, immigrant households have a
signi￿cantly larger number of children than native households, especially in the lowest income groups.
In turn, native households not residing in California have a number of children comparable to native
households residing in California. Thus, even if a ban on immigration would have led to an in￿ ow
of native households into California, the latter would have been quite similar, as far as fertility is
concerned, to California￿ s native households belonging to the same income group.
7.3 Immigrants￿Vote
To what extent is the drop in education spending per capita associated with immigration the
result of the fact that non-citizen immigrants cannot vote for higher levels of spending in the model
and possibly in reality as well? In principle the answer to this question is ambiguous. Immigrant
households tend to have relatively low income and are more likely to have school-age children rel-
ative to natives. The former e⁄ect makes them want to spend less than otherwise identical native
households on public education due to the fact that, by assumption, ￿ < 0: The latter e⁄ect should
make them want to spend more on public education than native households with the same income
but without children. To compute the net e⁄ect, I recomputed the majority equilibrium for each year
allowing all households to vote, independently of their citizenship status. The results are reported in
Table 7.
[Table 7 here]
Allowing non-citizen immigrants to vote in the model leads to higher tax rates and levels of spending.
By the year 2000, the model predicts that spending per student would have been about $269 higher
if non-citizen immigrants were allowed to vote over education spending. This is about 18 percent of
the drop in spending per student associated with immigration, according to the model (see Section
23These results are available from the author upon request.
285). The main reason for this is that, even if all households were allowed to vote in the status-quo
economy, the tax price of education faced by each household is larger in the status-quo than in the
counterfactual economy.
7.4 Sensitivity Analysis on the Price Elasticity Parameter
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to di⁄erent values of the utility parameter ￿; I
re-estimated the model assuming ￿ = ￿1: This corresponds to a more price inelastic demand than
the benchmark. Table 8 reports the main predictions of the model in this case.
[Table 8 here]
Since restrictions to immigration e⁄ectively reduce the relative price of education spending, the
model delivers smaller counterfactual education spending levels when ￿ = ￿1 than the benchmark
economy. According to this version of the model, immigration reduced education spending per student
by about $590 in 1990 and $950 in 2000, instead of $928 and $1,459 implied by the benchmark
calibration. The average cost of immigration among households, as measured by the equivalent
variation, is instead higher when demand for education is relatively more inelastic. Notice, however,
that when ￿ = ￿1; the model does not perform as well as the benchmark in tracking the actual level
of spending per student and the share of education spending in 1990 and 2000. Moreover, this version
of the model is less accurate in predicting private school attendance rates by native and pre-1970
immigrant households.
8 Conclusions
In this paper I quantify the impact of immigration on per student spending in public education
in California in the period 1970-2000. According to my computations, immigration has played a
major role in the decline in public education spending per student in California during the period in
consideration, especially after 1990.
The focus of the paper is the experience of the state of California. The latter is the major
immigrant receiving state in the U.S. and its education ￿nance system is such that education spending
29is approximately equalized among public school students and independent of households￿residential
location. Are the predictions of the model developed in this paper consistent with the experience of
other immigrant-receiving states, at least qualitatively? While it is outside the scope of this paper to
perform a systematic analysis of other states, the available evidence is in accordance with the main
results of this paper.
Consider, for example, the State of Florida. When U.S. states are ranked in terms of the change in
the share of school-age children from immigrant-headed households between 1970 and 2000 Florida
is fourth, while California is ￿rst.24 In addition, Florida￿ s education ￿nance system shares some
important features with California, with the state accounting for about two-thirds of the combined
state and local funding sources (Wood et al., undated). According to Census and NCES data in the
period 1970-2000 Florida has experienced a drop in education spending per student of about 4 percent
relative to the rest of the U.S. Interestingly, this has occurred despite an increase in the number of
households per student since 1970. Di⁄erently from California, the drop in education spending per
student has been driven by a sharp decline in the share of education spending relative to income
from 4.81 percent in 1970 to 4.10 percent in 2000. Florida￿ s experience can be explained using the
model developed in this paper. The key is the observation that the internal migration of retirees
to Florida has acted to balance the in￿ ow of immigrant households and led to an increase in the
number of households per student. However, according to my model, households without school-age
children display a smaller support for public education spending. In the language of the model, the
in￿ ow of retirees to Florida has shifted the identity of the median voter in the direction of smaller
tax rates. This interpretation is consistent with the evidence (Poterba, 1997) that demographic
di⁄erences among households are an important determinant of the share of spending devoted by a
state to public education.
Beyond Florida￿ s experience, the empirical results obtained by Poterba (1997) and Fernandez and
Rogerson (2001) using state-level panel regressions show that higher school enrollment is associated
with lower education spending per capita.25 Thus, the paper￿ s main results are likely to be general.
24According to Census data, after California, Texas has experienced the second largest increase in the share of
school-age children from immigrant-headed households, followed by Nevada, Florida, Rhode Island, and Arizona. The
traditional immigrant-receiving states such as New York, New Jersey, Illinois come in 8th, 7th, and 9th in this ranking.
25Along these lines, I ￿nd that the correlation between the state-level change in the share of school-age children from
immigrant-headed households and the change in a state￿ s education spending per student relative to the U.S. average
between 1970 and 2000 is equal to ￿0:70 and statistically signi￿cant.
30One might wonder whether higher school enrollment due to immigration would have a di⁄erent e⁄ect
on education spending per student than higher school enrollment by natives, due, for example, to a
baby-boom. Schrag (1998, page 9) hints at this point in relationship to California￿ s experience with
the provision of education and other public goods, by asking whether ￿...is the problem caused by
some combination of hostility and indi⁄erence on the part of a body of voters that isn￿ t sure it wants
to carry this kind of load for those kinds of people?￿To try to answer this question, I have augmented
a Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) type of panel regression with a variable that denotes the share of
children from immigrant households in total enrollment. The estimated coe¢ cient is negative but
small and not statistically di⁄erent from zero. While this issue deserves further scrutiny, I do not
￿nd clear-cut evidence for the ￿Schrag hypothesis￿ .26
What are the broader policy implications of this paper￿ s ￿ndings? As far as immigration is
concerned, the paper identi￿es a channel through which an in￿ ow of immigrants is likely to have
lowered the welfare of natives. Given the focus on a relatively narrow, although important, issue -
public education spending - no conclusion can be drawn from this result about the overall welfare
consequences of immigration. This point is reinforced by the observation that the nature of the
analysis performed here is essentially static. As has been pointed out (National Research Council,
1997) in order to evaluate the ￿scal consequences of immigration one would need to compute the taxes
paid and transfers received by immigrants over the course of their entire lifetime rather than at a
point in time only. The latter point raises an interesting dimension to the immigration debate. Even
if immigration was ￿scally neutral for a country as a whole, its costs and bene￿ts might not be evenly
distributed from a geographical point of view if immigrants were concentrated in a few regions of that
country. For example, while the state of California pays a large share of immigrants￿education, the
U.S. federal government collects federal taxes on the incomes of immigrants. The National Research
Council (1997, Table 6.5) estimates that the net annual ￿scal impact imposed by immigrant-headed
households on native residents in California in 1994 is small and positive as far as Federal revenues
and expenditures are concerned, and signi￿cantly negative at the state and local level. In other
words, California￿ s immigrants appear to make a small positive net contribution to the U.S. Federal
26Alesina et al. (1999) instead ￿nd some evidence in favor of this view. They estimate a negative correlation between
spending on education and other productive public goods and measures of ethnic fragmentation across U.S. cities and
metropolitan areas.
31government￿ s budget but a negative one for local and state budgets. This tension between federal
immigration policy and the regional ￿scal impact of immigration has become manifest in 1994 when
California and other states unsuccessfully ￿led a lawsuit against the U.S. federal government to
recover the costs of public education for illegal immigrants. At other times this tension might instead
be re￿ ected in the attitudes of natives toward immigrants. It would be interesting to explicitly
consider this issue and the welfare implications of alternative policy options such as, for example,
transfers from the federal to state governments linked to immigration ￿ ows.
As far as the education literature is concerned, the results of the paper help to put in perspective
the reform of the ￿nance system that occurred in California in the 1970￿ s by emphasizing the role of
immigration in the relative decline of public education spending per student. It would be interesting
to dig deeper into this comparison by explicitly considering the interactions between the nature of
education ￿nance and the consequences of demographic shifts like the one that occurred in California.
More speci￿cally, one could redo the exercise carried out in this paper considering a foundation
system, as the one described in Fernandez and Rogerson (1999). This system would have obviously
given rise to a certain amount of inequality in the distribution of education spending across school
districts and the in￿ ow of immigrants would have probably led to a signi￿cant increase in inequality
over time. From this perspective, the education ￿nance reform that occurred in California in the
early 1970￿ s had the unintentional e⁄ect of increasing the extent of redistribution from native to
immigrant households.
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35A Data Appendix
Yearly state-level data on current nominal expenditures and fall enrollment in public elementary and
secondary education for the school years 1969-1970 to 2004-2005 is from the National Center for Education
Statistics (http://nces.ed.gov).
Micro data at the yearly frequency for the period 1970 to 2005 comes from the Current Population
Survey. I have dropped from these samples individuals living in group quarters and with missing household
income information.
Micro data at the decennial frequency starting in 1970 are from the U.S. Census of the Population. The
following samples were obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al., 2008):
1970 1% Form 2 State sample, 1980, 1990, and 2000 5% State samples. For all years I drop individuals who
live in group quarters. A school-age individual is de￿ned as an individual who was between 5 and 17 years
of age at the time of the Census and was enrolled in school according to the Census￿criteria. The Census
also provides information on whether the individual is attending public or private school. In the model, the
choice of public vs private school is the same for all children in the same household, while in practice this
is not always the same (i.e. some households have some children in public and others in private school).
For practical purposes I assume a household has all of its children in public school if at least half of its own
school-age children in school are reported attending public school. In the model, a household￿ s number of
school-age children can take one of these values: 0, 1, 2, 3+ where the latter represents the average number
of school-age children in California in a given Census year among households with 3 or more school-age
children. In a given Census year, I de￿ne a household to be ￿immigrant￿ if its head (according to the
Census) satis￿es the following restrictions: (i) born outside of the 50 states of the U.S. and the District
of Columbia; (ii) not born abroad of American parents; (iii) immigrated to the U.S. after the year 1970.
Notice that requirement (iii) is introduced in the quantitative part of the model in order to use the year
1970 as a benchmark. A household is considered ￿native￿if its head is not an immigrant, according to the
requirements (i)-(iii) above. A household is considered ￿not a citizen￿if its head is not a citizen according to
the U.S. Census. Household income is the IPUMS variable ￿total household income￿after 1970. Since this
variable is not available for 1970, I have computed household income as the sum of total personal income of
all household members for that year.
36Table 1
Public Education Spending and its Components:
California vs the Rest of the U.S.
Total public education spending is from the National Center for Education Statistics and refers to the
academic year ending in the year mentioned in the table (e.g. 1969-1970 for 1970). Enrollment in public
schools, household income, and the number of households are all from the U.S. Census of Population. The
Census ￿gures exclude individuals living in group quarters. Household income refers to the year before
the census year. In the table CA stands for California, while US￿ refers to the rest of the U.S. excluding
California. Public education spending and household income are converted into 1999 CPI-U-RS adjusted
dollars.27
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000
CA US￿ CA US￿ CA US￿ CA US￿
Public education spending 3,510 3,133 4,806 4,509 6,222 6,510 6,338 7,065
per student (1999$)
Income share 5.48 5.59 4.94 5.56 4.70 5.67 5.06 5.49
of public education (%)
Public school students 65.08 66.82 47.22 51.39 43.47 41.04 52.28 43.04
per 100 households
Average household income 41,667 37,467 45,949 41,642 57,539 47,107 65,415 55,388
(1999$)
27The conversion factors are 3.918 for 1969, 2.139 for 1979, and 1.304 for 1989.
37Table 2
Immigration and School Attendance in California
￿Native￿in this table and in the paper refers to households who are either U.S. natives or immigrated
to the U.S. before 1970. ￿Immigrant￿refers to non-native households. The data are from the U.S. Census
of Population. The data refers to California only.
Year
1970 1980 1990 2000
% ￿native￿households without school-age children 65.57 71.51 75.58 73.59
% immigrant-headed households without school-age children - 62.42 52.99 48.46
Average # of school-age children per ￿native￿household with children 2.11 1.78 1.67 1.70
Average # of school-age children per immigrant household with children - 2.06 1.96 1.93
Average # of school age children per ￿native￿household 0.73 0.51 0.41 0.45
Average # of school age children per immigrant household - 0.77 0.92 1.00
% immigrant-headed households 0 5.89 15.96 29.65
% school children from immigrant-headed households 0 8.25 26.51 39.72
38Table 3
Estimated Parameter Values
The parameter ￿ is set a-priori to -0.25, which corresponds to the preferred value used by Fernandez
and Rogerson (1999). The remaining parameters have been estimated along the lines described in Section
4.
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿0:25 ￿1:8295 1:0027 ￿0:6891 0:1412
39Table 4
Model￿ s Predictions - California
The ￿rst ￿ve data moments in this table are constructed using the data described in the legend of Table
1. The last three moments were computed using data from the U.S. Census of Population. Public education
spending has been converted into 1999 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars.
Year 1980 1990 2000
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Public education 4,806 4,806 6,222 6,128 6,338 6,171
spending per student (1999$)
Income share 4.94 4.94 4.70 4.70 5.06 4.94
of public education (%)
Public school students 47.22 47.22 43.47 44.18 52.28 52.35
per 100 households
Ratio average public/ 81.51 81.51 65.95 60.87 59.04 47.96
private school income (￿100)
Coe¢ cient of variation 65.45 65.45 81.43 81.65 99.85 97.09
income public school (%)
Private school children 1.60 1.76 1.51 1.71 1.54 1.75
per private school households
Public school children 1.82 1.92 1.76 1.82 1.81 1.87
per public school households
% children from pre-1970 CA 9.84 10.13 10.21 9.15 11.23 11.55
households in private school
40Table 5
Counterfactual Experiments
Under the heading ￿No Immigration￿ , I present the results from the counterfactual exercise of restricted
immigration in the U.S. after 1970. The counterfactual exercise consists of using the model to predict the
variables reported in the Table￿ s rows by restricting attention to the conditional distribution of households
who had immigrated to the U.S. before 1970 (see equation 15). Under the heading ￿No Reform￿I present
the amount of public spending per student in California under the assumption that the share of public
education spending relative to income in California would have stayed constant over time relative to the rest
of the U.S. at its pre-education ￿nance reform 1970 value (i.e. 98 percent). Dollar ￿gures are expressed in
1999 dollars using the CPI-U-RS de￿ ator.
Year 1980 1990 2000
No Immigration
Public education spending per student (1999$) 4,983 7,056 7,630
Income share of public education (%) 4.92 4.55 4.65
Public school students per 100 households 46.05 38.23 41.78
% children in private school 9.21 6.19 6.81
Average household income 46,601 59,227 68,484
No Immigration - Constant School Choice
Public education spending per student (1999$) 4,998 7,146 7,764
Income share of public education (%) 4.89 4.46 4.49
Public school students per 100 households 45.55 37.00 39.61
% children in private school 10.13 9.15 11.55
No Reform of Education Finance System
Public education spending per student (1999$) 5,303 7,359 6,732
Income share of public education (%) 5.45 5.56 5.38
41Table 6
Alternative Measures of the Average (Per Household, Per Year) Fiscal Cost of
Immigration
Entries in this table correspond to two di⁄erent measures of the average (per household) ￿scal cost of
immigration. The ￿rst one is the extra taxes that, on average, a household has to pay in the status-quo
relative to the economy without post-1970 immigration. The second measure is the equivalent variation
when spending per student adjusts endogenously in response to restrictions to immigration. Figures are
expressed in 1999 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars.
Year
1980 1990 2000
Extra Taxes - Constant Expenditures 112 505 896
Equivalent Variation - Endogenous Policy 189 862 1,513
42Table 7
Model￿ s Predictions with Immigrants￿Vote - California
The table represents moments generated by two versions of the model. The ￿rst column (￿I. Vote￿ ) of
each year refers to the version of the model in which immigrants are allowed to vote, while the second column
(￿Bench.￿ ) reproduces the benchmark results of Table 4. Public education spending has been converted into
1999 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars.
Year 1980 1990 2000
Model Model Model
I. Vote Bench. I. Vote Bench. I. Vote Bench.
Public education 4,868 4,806 6,310 6,128 6,440 6,171
spending per student (1999$)
Income share 5.02 4.94 4.88 4.70 5.21 4.94
of public education (%)
Public school students 47.40 47.22 44.48 44.18 52.89 52.35
per 100 households
43Table 8
Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to the Price Elasticity Parameter ￿
In this table I present the results for ￿ = ￿1: The calibration procedure is described in Section 4 and it
is such that the model matches certain key moments in the year 1980. The estimates of the other parameters
of the model are: ￿￿= ￿2:8180; ￿￿= 1:2739; ￿ = ￿0:9865; ￿ = 0:1049. For each year, the column ￿Act￿
presents the prediction of the model for the moments of interest (i.e., the equivalent results to those in
Table 4). The column ￿Cou￿ instead presents the results of the counterfactual experiment of restricted
immigration (i.e., the equivalent results to those in Table 5). Dollar ￿gures are expressed in 1999 dollars
using the CPI-U-RS de￿ ator.
Year 1980 1990 2000
Act. Cou. Act. Cou. Act. Cou.
Public education spending 4,806 4,922 6,055 6,645 6,089 7,039
per student (1999$)
Income share of 4.94 4.92 4.74 4.43 4.81 4.30
public education (%)
Public school students 47.22 46.57 45.09 39.52 51.64 41.85
per 100 households
% children from pre-1970 CA 10.35 8.18 7.22 3.03 14.27 6.65
households in private school
Average equivalent variation - 198 - 916 - 1,620
44Figure 1: Decomposition of the evolution of education spending per student in California relative
to the rest of the U.S. Data source: Current Population Survey and National Center for Education
Statistics.
Figure 2: Decomposition of the evolution of education spending per student in California relative
to the rest of the U.S. Data source: U.S. Census of Population and National Center for Education
Statistics.
45Figure 3: Counterfactual evolution of spending per student in California relative to the rest of the
U.S., using natives￿ratio of households per student. Data sources: U.S. Census of Population and
National Center for Education Statistics.
Figure 4: Evolution of private school attendance in California relative to the rest of the U.S. and of
the share of native households. Data source: U.S. Census of Population.
46Figure 5: Plot of average (relative to the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity) equivalent vari-
ations against household income for di⁄erent values of n. The ￿gure also contains the ￿scal cost of
immigration computed using the standard approach.
47